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THE LAW OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION

P. K. MENON*

INTRODUCTION
Unlawful possession is a criminal offence which is charged not infrequently in the English-speaking Caribbean countries. It is essentially a
creation of statute, the precise origin of which is not clear.
Criminal law in the Caribbean is primarily the progeny of the English Common Law and statutes existent at the time of Great Britain's acquisition either by way of settlement, conquest, or cession of these territories. Be that as it may, the introduction into the colonies of a new breed
of criminal offence, only remotely known in the mother country, is the
outcome of the intellectual ingenuity of the colonial legislators.
The unlawful possession legislation, as will be shown, is contrary to
the "golden thread" spirit of English law.' The legislation appears to have
been designed to fit the needs of the prosecution and to alleviate the burdens of an undermanned law enforcement organization in situations where
it is difficult to produce sufficient evidence to prove larceny or the reception of stolen goods. In spite of its utility, as a crime deterrent device, overextensive use of this police power may debase the individual. The courts
have recognized the ill effects on the alleged offender of a charge of unlawful possession and have been scrupulously cautious in their interpretation
and application of the provisions of the law to the facts.
*J.S.D., LL.M. (New York University); LL.M. (McGill University); LL.B.
(Bombay University); B.Com. (Madras University); formerly Staff Member and
Expert Consultant, United Nations Institute for Training and Research and United
Nations Secretariat, New York (1968-1972); Director of the Criminal Law Pro)gramme, University of the West Indies, Faculty of Law, Barbados (1973-

THE GENESIS OF THE OFFENCE
The offence of unlawful possession of property is not unknown in
English law; it draws certain selected characteristics from such predeces-
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sors as the United Kingdom Metropolitan Police Courts Act of 1839 and
the Larceny Act of 1861.2 In combining these various elements, the offence
in the Caribbean context has surpassed overwhelmingly the nature and
scope of its predecessors and has acquired its own unique feature.
Section 24 of the Metropolitan Police Courts Act of 18393 states:
. . . every Person who shall be brought before any of the said
Magistrates charged with having in his Possession or conveying in
any Manner anything which may be reasonably suspected of being
stolen or unlawfully obtained, and who shall not give an Account to
the Satisfaction of such Magistrate how he came by the same, shall
be deemed guilty of a Misdemeanour, and shall be liable to a Penalty
of not more than Five Pounds, or, in the Discretion of the Magistrate,
may be imprisoned in any Gaol or House of Correction within the
Metropolitan Police District, with or without hard Labour, for any
Time not exceeding Two Calendar Months.
By Section 66 of the Act, a constable may detain and search any
vessel, cart or carriage in or upon which there shall be reason to suspect
that anything stolen or unlawfully obtained may be found, and also any
person reasonably suspected of having or conveying such a thing. 4 Further,
in accordance with section 69, any one apprehended without a warrant is
to be taken to the nearest station house until he can be brought before a
5
magistrate.
Succinctly stated, the Act provides that a man who is found in suspicious circumstances in possession of property which is stolen or unlawfully obtained may be asked by the law enforcement officer to give an
account of how he got it. If the answer is not satisfactory, he shall be
liable to a penalty.
Until recently, the act was construed in England rather restrictively.
For example, in the case of Hadley v. Perks, Justice Lush, dealing with
the effect of both Sections 24 and 66, held that a constable has the power
to apprehend a person in a public street with property improperly come by
or stolen. 6 The rationale behind the power of apprehension is that if not
stopped at once the suspect "might get out of the way, and evade detection
altogether. ' '7 Therefore the suspicion should occur in the public street or
in the open, and nowhere else. But the decision in Willey v. Peace8 suggests that the power of apprehension by the police need not be confined
to the public streets. Even if one has left the street, he may be searched and
detained. Thus, according to Lord Goddard, C.J., "A person does not cease
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to be conveying or having something in his possession if he has it when
he walks along the street and then goes into a police station with the thing
still in his possession, and is going to walk out of the police station if the
police let him go." 9
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Unlike England, the Caribbean states - both code and non-code jurisdictions - have detailed statutory provisions dealing with the offence of
unlawful possession. These provisions, by and large, do not differ widely
from one territory to another.
Code Countries
The Penal Code of the Bahamas contains a general provision with regard to the requirement that the individual account for possession of anything suspected of having been stolen.10
Grenada1 1 and St. Lucia 12 have similar provisions in their criminal
codes dealing with unlawful possession of anything in general and, in particular, possession of cattle or meat products thereof, plants or plant products, and instruments or equipment for obtaining, secreting, or removing
liquors. St. Lucia, in addition, provides conviction for unlawful possession
of property stolen, goods from distressed vessels, and property stolen elsewhere and brought into the country. 13
Belize has a separate statutory instrument, "The Unlawful Possession
of Property Ordinance,"14 which regulates the offence. The ordinance delineates the powers of the police to arrest suspects and to board vessels, as
well as the procedures for the issuing of search warrants, tracing possession, and for trial and punishment.
Non-Code Countries
In Antigua,1s St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla,16 Montserrat,17 and the
Virgin Islands,18 the general provision prohibiting the unlawful possession
of property is enacted through the Small Charges Act.
In Barbados" and St. Vincent, 20 it appears under the Magistrates
Jurisdiction and Procedure Act and the Summary Jurisdiction Offences
Act, respectively.
Dominica has a similar general provision, 21 as well as particular provisions forbidding the unlawful possession of trees, stolen property, 22
deer, 23 and goods from distressed vessels. 24 A significant departure from

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

the standard Caribbean law that may be noted in this context is that under
Dominica's general provision, a suspect is not liable for conviction "if
he proves that he had possession of such thing for more than three months".
The unlawful possession of property ordinance in the Turks and
Caicos Islands2 5 is similar to the Belizian law referred to earlier.
26
In Guyana, Section 94 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act
regards possession of things which are reasonably suspected to have been
stolen, including bicycles as an offence. Sections 95, 96, and 97 deal with
possession of animals, instruments for obtaining liquor, and goods from
distressed vessels.
In The Cayman Islands2 7 and Jamaica, 2S the law is generally the
same and may be found under the title "The Unlawful Possession of
Property Law", Chapters 178 and 401, respectively. The law applies to
suspects who are in unlawful possession of any goods, including articles of
agricultural produce specified in the Schedule to the Act. Unlike the Caymans, Jamaican law distinguishes between agricultural produce and other
goods. Concerning the former, a suspect comes within the purview of the
provision if he "has had in his possession or under his control anything
being an article of agriculture produce. '2 9 The powers conferred on the
police personnel and those accorded "authorized persons" are not the
same. The "authorized persons" referred to in 'the law exercise powers
30
only with respect to unlawful possession of agricultural goods.
In Trinidad and Tobago, 31 the Summary Offences Ordinance contains
provisions dealing with unlawful possession of goods, and in particular,
possession of trees, cattle, and articles from distressed, wrecked, or stranded
vessels.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE OFFENCE
A typical statute creating the offence of unlawful possession may be
worded as follows: Any person having in his possession, or conveying in
any manner anything which may reasonably be suspected of having been
stolen or unlawfully obtained, and who shall not give an account satisfactory to the Magistrate of how he came by the same, shall be liable to a
fine.
Possession
The principal ingredient of the offence is possession of anything not
lawfully obtained. The law is intended to punish such possession and
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thereby to prevent future disturbances of rightful possession. "Having in
possession" is different from merely being "in possession". Being in posession is not an act, but a legal status. This category of offence includes
possession of dangerous drugs, explosives, counterfeit coins, currency
notes, and government stamps and seals.
The word possession is not defined in the Act. In common usage, it
means physical control of the goods by the person himself or by his
agent. Control may be actual or potential. The case of actual physical
control is easily understood. For example, the handbag which I carry
is in my possession. However this does not necessarily mean that physical
hold implies possession in every case. 32 Equally comprehensible is the sit-

uation where a person can readily obtain actual physical control even
though it does not exist presently. For instance, the clothes in the dressing table and the tape recorder in the sitting room are in my possession.
Goods found on the premises occupied by licensees are not under their
possession. Similarly, a servant or agent does not have possession of goods
on his master's premises. In Garraway and Others v. Heber, 33 the five appellants occupied premises in which were found a quantity of motor vehicle
parts, a car radio and some clothing. They had been given permission to
stay there by the owner, Rampersad, who was at the time in the hospital.
Rampersad had owned and kept on the premises a taxicab which was
operated by one of the appellants. Another of the appellants, Welch, took
charge of the premises, as directed by the owner during his absence.
In delivering the judgement, Chief Jutice Wooding said:
. . . the four remaining appellants (other than Welch) were mere
licensee occupiers, if occupiers at all, of the respective portions of the
premises in which they were found . . . In our judgement, joint
possession cannot be inferred from these facts against these five
appellants . . . it would in our view be plainly unjust to fix a servant
or agent with the possession of goods in his master's premises merely
because as such servant or agent he is left for the time being to take
care of premises during his master's absence through illness in hospital or merely because he operated a service in which the suspected
parts might be used and they were found under a bed in a room which
34
he shared with a number of others.
Mere location of goods on the premises occupied by a person does not
establish his control and may not amount to possession. In Evans v. R.,35
Chief Justice A. M. Lewis of the Court of Appeal of West Indies Associated
States said:
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...the mere finding of stolen goods in a room occupied by a person
is not sufficient of itself alone to prove possession. Something more
must be proved in order to connect him with the control of those
goods, either to show that they came into the room at his invitation
or by his arrangement, or that having found them there, he assumed
36
control over them.
In determining joint possession of goods by a man and woman occupying the same premises, an important factor is their marital status.
Thus in Braithwaite v. Harris,37 Chief Justice Worley commented, "When
a wife is living in her husband's house there may be a presumption that
the furniture and bedding in the house are his property, but this presumption does not arise if a man and woman are living together in concubinage.
In such a case the man may have come to live with the woman or, if the
woman has come to live with the man, she may have brought her own
furniture and bedding ..." This fine distinction has been blurred somewhat by the decision in R. v. Maragh38 where the Court of Appeal in Jamaica held that despite the wife's proprietorship of the shop by holding
the retailer's licence, "the appellant (husband) was at least jointly in con9
trol of this shop.""3
Most of the territories have employed the basic principle of "having
in possession;" Dominica and St. Lucia, however, have extended this concept to "having had in possession" and "has had in possession" respectively.
Jamaica has also extended this rule with respect to an article of agricultural produce. The broader principle followed in these territories is important and has been subjected to judicial interpretation by the Jamaican
Court of Appeal in Murphy v. Richards.40 In that case, the plaintiff
claimed damages for assault and false imprisonment against a police constable who had arrested him for the unlawful possession of a cow even
though the animal was not in his possession at the time of the arrest.
In delivering judgement of the Court, Justice Cools-Lartigue, held as
follows:
The first point raised for our consideration by learned counsel for the
appellant was that the appellant, at the time of his arrest, was not in fact
in possession of any cow; that he was consequently not a "suspected
person" as defined under the Unlawful Possession of Property Law,
Cap. 401[J], and that therefore his arrest was unlawful ..It appears to us obvious in view of that definition that the appellant was
not a "suspected person" at the time of his arrest.4 1
-
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Having in Possessionor Conveying in Any Manner
The phrase "having in possession or conveying in any manner" has
been interpreted by the courts in both England 42 and in the Caribbean43
and there is divergence of opinion as to its meaning.
In the English parent case Hadley v. Perks,44 the words were interpreted restrictively. It was not enough that the goods were merely possessed; they must be possessed for the purpose of being conveyed. 45 Furthermore, the Court was of the opinion that the Act "applies only to offences, or to the suspicion of offences, out of doors - to street offences,
cases in which circumstances occur in the street, which give reason to
suspect that property has been stolen or unlawfully obtained.' 6 The decision, therefore, determined that the legislation applied only where goods
were suspected to be in transit.47 In other words, the law did not provide

authority for a constable to arrest without warrant any person having in
his possession, in any house, store, or other private habitat anything which
might reasonably be suspected to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained.
This restrictive interpretation of the statute by the English courts has
prompted, it appears, many of the Caribbean territories to amend their
laws. 49 The amendment took various forms. In general, "having in his
possession or conveying in any manner" has been replaced by "having in
his possession or under his control in any manner or in any place."' 49 Since
then, several court decisions have given the words their natural meaning
and have refused to cut down on the generality of the language.5 0
In 1964, after making searching analysis of the historical development
of the offence, Sir Hugh Wooding concluded that the phrase "must be
given a restricted meaning, that is to say, that they must be construed as
meaning in any public place." 51 His decision was based on the following
considerations: (1) the requirement of a warrant to enter and search private premises; (2) the express authority to enter or board any vessel upon
a public waterway; and (3) the inviolability at common law of the privacy of private premises upon which the public have no right.5 2 Nevertheless, the Privy Council did not approve the restrictive meaning and
did not find any reason for introducing the additional limiting word
public. From their Lordship's point of view,

rt]he language of S.36(1) is clear and their Lordships see no reason
for introducing additional words in to it. The words in the section
are "in any place". If the words in S. 36(1) are being considered
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by themselves their meaning would not seem to admit of doubt. Nor
have their Lordships found any reason as the result of an examination
to give
of the following subsections and sections of the Ordinance
53
ones.
natural
their
than
other
meanings
to the words any
Anything
From the context, the word anything should mean things capable
of being stolen or unlawfully obtained. The offence can be committed by
54
having in one's possession any chattel, money or valuable security under
circumstances as provided in the Ordinance; it cannot possibly be committed by possession of immovable things, abandoned goods, or articles of
no value."5
56
As Glanville Williams points out, the scope of "unlawfully obtained"
is rather vague. He continues, "There is no judgement of a superior court
on the point, but during the Second World War metropolitan magistrates
refused to hold that rationing offences came within the purview of the
legislation, which they thought was confined to offences of theft and
7
fraud."

Reasonable Suspicion
Before the accused is called upon to give a satisfactory account, the
magistrate should be satisfied not only that the goods were found in the
suspect's possession, but also that the constable had reasonable cause to
suspect the goods to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained.
The term reasonable cause is difficult to define. Perhaps it is sufficient that the facts and surrounding circumstances are such as to allow
a person of prudence and caution to suspect that the goods in question
are stolen or unlawfully obtained.
Good faith alone may not be enough to constitute reasonable cause.
That faith must be grounded on facts within knowledge of the arresting
constable, which in the considered judgement of the magistrate would
58
make this faith reasonable.
There are many surrounding circumstances which affect a determination of a criteria, for reasonable cause. Some of them are nature of the
thing possessed, details of description, character of the person, time of
day, concealed conduct, admission of the person being questioned, criminal record of the person and his associates, reputation of the location, and
any recent crime wave in the neighbourhood.
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As mentioned earlier, in hearing a charge of unlawful possession the
magistrate is required to examine two key questions. The first is whether
the constable suspected that the goods found were stolen or unlawfully
obtained; the second is whether the constable had reasonable cause for
suspicion.
With regard to the first question, the element of subjectivity is the
predominant consideration because "the mental state of suspicion must
be borne of the preception by the constable of particular circumstances
59
or factors which operate to produce that mental state." The constable
must have information that the things actually have been stolen or unlawfully obtained and not that they are suspected to be stolen or unlawfully
Herbert60
obtained. Thus Wooding C.J. held in Garraway and Others v.
.. . the section authorises the issue of a search warrant only if a
police constable is able bona fide to swear, and in fact does, that goods
which have been actually stolen or unlawfully obtained, and which
therefore should be specified in such a way that they can be plainly
identified are suspected on reasonable grounds to be concealed or
locked in the premises sought to be searched. It does not extend to
authorising the issue of a warrant to search for goods which are
. . .61
merely suspected to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained
With regard to the second question, reasonable cause is "a positive
fact capable of determination by a third party as is a broken ankle or a
legal right." 62 A police officer having reason to suspect does not mean
63
and cannot mean an officer thinking he has reason to suspect. The test
this point,
is objective and the standard is of a reasonable man. Elaborating
64
Joseph:
v.
Boodoo
in
explained
Wooding
Justice
Chief
Not only must cause exist; it must also be reasonable. And whether
it is reasonable will depend upon all the known circumstances of each
case. In some cases, the possession or lack of relevant information
may be significant; in others, it may be of no consequence whatever.
No single factor can be posited as essential. The facts must be examobjectively according to the standined dispassionately and assessed
6
ards of the reasonable man. 5
Reasonable suspicion has to be aroused in the constable himself and
66
not injected into him through some one else. In R. v. Burgess, the accused Burgess was seen to take some powder from a shop and put it in a
bag. When accosted, he dropped the bag and ran away. He was caught
by a citizen shortly thereafter, and a constable was called. When the con-
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stable opened the bag, he saw the powder, together with three clocks and
forty-two knives, which became the subject of the unlawful possession
charge. The Jamaican Court of Appeal held that the accused was wrongly
convicted ". . . as he, not having been found in possession of the articles
by the arresting constable, was not a suspected person as defined by the
Unlawful Possession of Property Law, Chap. 401."67
The arresting constable has to produce specific or inferential evidence
to show that, prior to the arrest, he had reasonable cause to suspect the
goods were either stolen or unlawfully obtained. In R. v. Walters,68 the
police, armed with a search warrant, searched the appellant's home (a
room and a hall) and found under his bed a bag containing 153 pounds
of sugar. The appellant said that he had found it on a ship and put it
there. He was arrested for unlawful possession of the sugar. The court,
dismissing the appeal, said:
In this case we are satisfied that the circumstances surrounding the
finding of the sugar indicate the ground for suspicion, namely, the
large quantity of sugar found, the place where it was found-under
the bed, the status in life of the appellant which was apparent to the
constable, and the statement of the appellant before arrest. These
facts were together sufficient to raise in the mind of the constable a
reasonable suspicion that the sugar was stolen or unlawfully obtained
69
and to justify his arrest.
However, in Obadiah Parkinson v. R., 70 the Supreme Court of Jamaica held that there was no evidence of reasonable suspicion when the
Detective Corporal, acting under a warrant to search the appellant's premises for articles of hardware, failed to find these, but found a huge collection of brassieres and a roll of blue lace in the bedroom.
Should reasonable cause of suspicion be related to the thing possessed or to the person possessing the thing? At first sight, the wording
of the section might suggest that it refers to the thing. A more careful
examination of the section may reveal that the suspicion does not relate
solely to the thing possessed quite independent of the conduct of the
possessor.
In Langdevine v. Dysal Singh,71 the Guyanese Court of Appeal held
that the only requirement is evidence of possession and that the thing
possessed is reasonably suspected to be stolen or unlawfully obtained
property. According to Chief Justice Verity, "In other words, it is in
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and
relation to the thing itself that there must attach reasonable suspicion
72
not to the conduct of the person found in possession thereof."
On the other hand, in Boodoo v. Joseph, 3 Philips, J. A. of the Court
of Appeal, Trinidad and Tobago, stated that a person's conduct may be
a more reliable basis on which to found a suspicion than information
given about him by someone else.74 He continued to say, "Such information which ex hypothesi would be of self-incriminating character, is in
reality merely one species of conduct indicative of guilt; and there accordingly appears to be no valid reason for the exclusion of other such
76
75
indications from consideration." In a later case, Ramcharan v. Arietas,
Chief Justice Wooding placed heavy reliance on the conduct of the person
and said that "evidence as to the behaviour of the appellant is, if believed,
such as makes it impossible to avoid the conclusion that the appellant was
seeking to hide from the corporal the existence in his premises of the pan
with the jewellery and raw gold which was brought into court. '77 In a
more recent case, Freeman v. Scott,7 8 it was the suspicious behaviour of
the accused in transferring articles to his car at the Port-of-Spain General
Hospital that prompted Constable Scott to arrest him and which resulted
in a conviction.
The better view appears to be that of Graham-Perkins, J.A. in R. v.
Melvin Spragg:79 "the right and duty to arrest flowed from the existence,
in the constable effecting the search, not only of reasonable cause to
suspect anything found to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained but also
of reasonable cause to suspect anything found to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained but also of reasonable cause to suspect that the person
in whose house or premises, a thing is found or any other person found in
such house or premises."
The Account
If the magistrate is satisfied that there was possession, as well as reasonable suspicion that the goods were stolen or unlawfully obtained, it is
left to the defendant to give a satisfactory account of his possession to the
court. In default, he will suffer the penalty prescribed by the law.
The word satisfactory is not defined in the Act. The magistrate may
not be interested and hence may not be satisfied merely to listen to an
honest account explaining the fact of possession. The interpretation given
by the judges indicates that "he will be satisfied but only by hearing an
account which is at the same time true and satisfactory to the criminal
law."8 0
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In an early decision, the Supreme Court of Jamaica said that "it is
not sufficient that he [the defendant] should produce on the mind of the
Court a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." 81 Later decisions, on the other
hand, demonstrate that if the explanation of the defendant is reasonably
true, having regard to all the circumstances, the magistrate must direct
himself that if he is satisfied that the possession was innocent or is left
in doubt as to this question, the case should be acquitted.8 2
On the basis of recent decisions, it may be concluded, that any reasonable and true explanation, not necessarily the only one that convinces
the magistrate, is accepted as a satisfactory explanation. In R. v. Doreen
Hill,8 3 a detective constable received certain information concerning a
robbery, housebreaking, and larceny committed in the Montego Bay area.
On the same day, he went to Montego Bay, and there he saw the appellant. As the constable approached the appellant, she suddenly put her hand
behind her back. The constable noticed that she was wearing a gold ring,
a gold Perseguax ladies' watch, and a gold chain and pendant, as well as
other jewelry. When asked how she came into possession of the articles,
she said that she had bought them from someone from Kingston. The
constable then informed her that he did not believe her story, and she
was driven to the police station.
On the way, the appellant jumped out of the car. The constable
recaptured her and took her to the Montego Bay police station where she
was informed that he believed that the articles had been obtained unlawfully. She was then arrested and charged with unlawful possession.
In the account the appellant gave to the Resident Magistrate, she
described herself as unemployed but a "sport" when she worked. The
chain had been given to her by a boy. The ring and the watch she had
bought from a travelling salesman in Montego Bay.
The Court of Appeal considered all the evidence and came to the
conclusion that the Magistrate erred in not being satisfied with the explanation given him by the appellant. The court cited King v. Brown8
as precedent for its decision. In that case Justice Brown said:
I venture, however, to think that though the burden of proof is on
the prisoner, the evidence must be viewed reasonably, and, if it appears that the account given by the prisoner is one which appears to
be reasonably true, he should not be convicted.8 5
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The Court of Appeal concluded that the appellant gave a reasonable
explanation concerning her possession of the articles and that the magistrate should have so held. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, the conviction
quashed, and the sentence set aside.
The magistrate is expected to make a judicial enquiry to determine
whether there is reasonable ground for suspecting the accused. This suggests that the accused should be given an opportunity to probe the evidence in chief by cross examination with a view of establishing his innocence. Denial of that opportunity "is contrary to natural justice and an
86
improper exercise of the Resident Magistrate's function.
Tracing Possession
In a few cases the accused may merely be the innocent agent, carrier,
or servant of another. In those cases, he is given an opportunity to show
that the property in his custody is actually in the constructive possession
of the employer. Most of the territories have detailed provisions to handle such situations. An example of such provisions is that of Trinidad
and Tobago which states:
If any person brought or appearing before a Magistrate .. .
"(1)
declares that he received any such thing as therein mentioned from
some other person, or that he was employed as a carrier, agent, or
servant to convey the same for some other person, the Magistrate may
cause every such other person, and also any other person through
whose possession any such thing shall previously have passed, to be
brought before him.
(2) Upon any such person as is in the last preceding subsection
mentioned being brought before him, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to examine him as to whether he has been in possession of any
such thing as aforesaid, and upon his admitting such possession, or
upon its being proved to the satisfaction of the Magistrate that such
person has been in possession of any such thing, the Magistrate may
call upon such person to give an account to the satisfaction of the
Magistrate by what lawful means such person came by such thing,
and if such person fails, within a reasonable time to be assigned by
such Magistrate, to give such account, he shall be liable to a fine. ...
(3) For the purposes of this section, the possession of a carrier,
agent, or servant shall be deemed to be the possession of the person
who shall have employed such carrier, agent, or servant to convey the
82
same."

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The law of unlawful possession is a sweeping rule which is contrary
to the basic principle of time-honoured English jurisprudential theory that
the onus of proof of a criminal offence is on the prosecution. It is also
against the English common laws which do not permit police officers
to search a person simply because he may have committed some crime.
Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and by the rules of evidence. These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give the police fair
leeway to enforce the law for the community's safety and protection.
It is universally agreed, under the common law and otherwise, that
a police officer may arrest a felony suspect without a warrant. He may
also make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanour committed in
his presence, if the misdemeanour amounts to a breach of the peace, that
is, if it contains an element of actual or threatened violence. Public safety
and the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous crimes require that such arrests be made at once without a warrant because of the
danger that the offender may escape or dispose of evidence before the
officer can obtain a warrant.
The unlawful possession statutes permit the constable to search and
arrest the citizen merely because the constable has reasonable cause to
suspect that the goods in his possession are stolen or unlawfully obtained.
Uncontrolled search may deprive the individual of his fundamental rights
to liberty, security, and privacy, to the detriment of the spirit of the
individual.
The courts and legal writers have endeavoured to define and explain
the term reasonable, but unfortunately there is no scientific definition to
fit all situations. In some cases, the question of what is reasonable may be
obscure, and this obscurity may create a conflict of interests: a conflict
between the powers of the constable and the rights of the citizen. If the
police act unreasonably, what rights do the citizens- especially the weak
and the poor - have?
The prevention of crime is of a grave concern to society, and the percentage of theft cases is rising to unprecedented levels. It is also true that
if the constable does not take immediate action at the sight of goods which
he believes to be stolen, the suspect as well as the goods may disappear
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swiftly. Supporters of the statute may well say that the provision is a
powerful weapon for the effective prevention of crime and enforcement of
the law.
Admittedly, the safety of the country requires effective measures of
crime detection and a deterrence punishment. At the same time, the society
is also concerned with the rights of its citizens to live in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must yield to the
right of search, it is to be decided by a judicial officer and not by a
policeman. The efforts of the police to capture the accused should not be
sacrificed to the well-established principles of judicial determination.
Striking the unlawful possession law provisions from the statute might
result in some impairment of the efficiency of law enforcement agencies.
But this price is worth paying in a democratic society since it safeguards
the freedom of the whole population. The oft-quoted saying is that "it is
far, far better that the guilty escape justice than that injustice be visited
'8 3
upon the innocent.

NOTES
iThe "golden thread" spirit of English law is that the burden of proof is on
the prosecution, and the prosecution must prove its charge beyond reasonable doubt.
Emphasizing the importance of this principle, Lord Viscount Sankey, L. C., in
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